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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-1080 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
     
   
v. 
 
SANNY CHIP, 
    Appellant  
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
No. 2:17-cr-00227-001 
District Judge: Hon. Harvey Bartle, III 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and PORTER, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed: January 29, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
  
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
  
Federal law prohibits someone from persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a 
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. Here, the appellant, Sanny Chip, and an 
undercover agent posing as a minor met on a smartphone app and exchanged sexually 
charged messages. Ultimately, they agreed to meet up to have sex. Chip was arrested at 
the scene of the planned encounter. A jury found him guilty and the District Court 
sentenced him to ten years in prison. On appeal, Chip argues that because the purported 
minor was a willing participant in the planned sexual encounter, he did not entice the 
minor and thus the evidence was insufficient to convict him. 
Because a rational juror could consider the evidence sufficient to support Chip’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm. 
I 
The background facts are largely undisputed. Over the course of several days in 
March 2017, Chip exchanged hundreds of messages with “Henry Gia”—supposedly a 14-
year-old boy, but actually an undercover agent with the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s 
Office. The conversation started on Jack’d, “an app where men meet to have quick sexual 
contact with each other.” 2 J.A. 43. 
Under an anonymous username, Chip initiated contact with Henry. Early in the 
conversation, Henry asked Chip how old he was. Chip reported that he was 26 years old. 
Henry revealed that even though his Jack’d profile listed his age as 18, he was really only 
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14. Despite this revelation, Chip continued messaging with Henry—first on the Jack’d 
app, and later on Kik, another messaging app that anonymizes user information. 
 Chip and Henry quickly started discussing sex. Henry revealed that he was 
sexually inexperienced, while Chip recounted his more substantial sexual history. The 
two made plans to meet over the coming days. Chip advised Henry—often, in graphic 
detail—on what to expect in the upcoming encounter. Less than a week after the first 
messages were sent, Chip drove about 20 minutes to a Rite Aid to meet Henry for a 
sexual encounter. Law-enforcement agents arrested Chip at the scene. 
Federal prosecutors charged Chip with a single count of enticing a minor to 
engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), as the statute criminalizes 
illegal sexual activity and Chip’s conduct was illegal under Pennsylvania law. At trial, 
the transcript of the messages between Henry and Chip formed the central evidence 
against Chip. After hearing that evidence, a jury found Chip guilty and the District Court 
sentenced Chip to the statutory minimum of ten years in prison. On appeal, Chip argues 
that the evidence was insufficient to support the enticement conviction.1 
II 
“We apply a deferential standard in determining whether a jury’s verdict rests on 
sufficient evidence.” United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2008). We have 
stated that “[t]he burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
                                              
1 Chip was charged with violating federal criminal law, so the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This appeal is from a final decision of the District 
Court, so we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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evidence is extremely high,” United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and “a decision to reverse a conviction on 
grounds of insufficiency should be confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is 
clear,” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 1986). 
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and will uphold 
the verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ozcelik, 527 F.3d at 93 (quoting United States v. 
Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
III 
It is a federal crime if someone “knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or 
coerces” a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, “or attempts to do so.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2422(b). While “§ 2422(b) does not define the terms ‘persuade,’ ‘induce,’ ‘entice’ and 
‘coerce,’ they ‘have a plain and ordinary meaning that does not need further technical 
explanation.’” United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 562 (9th Cir. 2004)). Three of the terms—
“persuade,” “induce,” and “entice”—are “effectively synonymous, conveying the idea of 
one person leading or moving another by persuasion or influence, as to some action [or] 
state of mind.” United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2016) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Chip argues that he did not violate this statute because enticement is impossible on 
these facts. He admits that he messaged with Henry and planned to have sex with him. 
Chip freely concedes that this conduct was inappropriate and potentially violated state 
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law and other federal statutes. Chip maintains, however, that his conduct does not violate 
the enticement statute because Henry demonstrated an “unwavering” interest in a sexual 
encounter, and thus the evidence does not show an attempt by Chip to persuade, induce, 
entice, or coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity. Appellant’s Br. at 18. Based on the 
messages, Chip rightly characterizes Henry as an interested participant. But § 2422(b) 
focuses on Chip’s conduct, and Chip attempted to persuade Henry to meet for a sexual 
liaison. Specifically, Chip urged Henry to meet in person, reassured Henry that he had 
nothing to fear from what would be his first sexual experience, and made the prospect of 
a sexual liaison more attractive to an apparently hesitant Henry. 
From the outset, Chip pushed Henry to meet in person. Chip first broached the 
subject, asking Henry if he had “any plans today?” 2 J.A. 253. Chip disclosed that he 
lacked plans, and was “looking to make friends and hang out.” 2 J.A. 254. Chip asked 
Henry what he was “looking for” on the app. 2 J.A. 260. A seasoned Jack’d user, Chip 
suggested that an in-person meeting was the “next part” that follows chatting on the app 
and explained the typical protocol for such a meeting. 2 J.A. 272. Later in the 
conversation, Chip again volunteered that he “[k]inda want to hang out” and pressed the 
subject. 2 J.A. 275. When Henry had to postpone the initial scheduled meeting, Chip 
pivoted and asked Henry about his weekend availability. Overall, while Henry indicated a 
willingness to meet, Chip consistently returned to the practical logistics of obtaining the 
meeting. 
Chip also reassured the inexperienced Henry that he had nothing to fear from a 
meeting once one was scheduled. When Henry asked if it was “bad” that he lacked sexual 
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experience, Chip assured him “that’s ok.” 2 J.A. 252. When Henry similarly asked if it 
was “bad” that he watched gay pornography, Chip encouragingly advised: “You’re still 
learning it’s normal.” 2 J.A. 256. When Henry asked if anal sex hurt, Chip assured him 
that “[i]t feels good when you get use to it.” 2 J.A. 258. More explicitly, when Henry 
asked how to make sure it did not hurt, Chip explained “You can use lube … [i]t’s gonna 
help slide the cock in.” 2 J.A. 296, 298. When Henry said that he did not have lube, Chip 
said he would bring it to their meeting (and he did). In discussing these topics, Chip told 
Henry “[y]ou can be honest with me.” 2 J.A. 264. Such reassurances provide ample 
evidence of persuasion. 
Chip portrays these reassurances differently, arguing that they came in response to 
Henry’s questions. But Chip’s soft-sell approach made strategic sense in the context of 
the exchange. Henry made clear that he was concerned about meeting a “creeper” on the 
app. 2 J.A. 268–69. Henry confided that he “would be scared” about meeting a bad guy. 2 
J.A. 269–70. And he revealed he would “be nervous” if he met someone from the app in 
person. 2 J.A. 271. Given Henry’s reservations, Chip had to allay Henry’s fears for a 
meeting to occur—and he did. Chip assured Henry that there was no need to be 
apprehensive. After Henry described himself as “shy,” Chip agreeably characterized both 
of them as shy. 2 J.A. 324, 329. Assuaging a minor’s fears, like Chip did here, may show 
enticement. See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting 
defendant sent purported minor “an email reassuring her” that sex would not be painful). 
Beyond these general reassurances, Chip specifically portrayed sex as enjoyable 
and enticing to the inexperienced Henry. When Henry asked about doing “top n bottom 
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stuff” at the planned meeting, Chip suggested that Henry watch pornography but 
instructed him not to masturbate because “you will need to be in the mood later and you 
can’t spoil that.” 2 J.A. 289–92. Chip’s messages sometimes appeared to make Henry 
feel as though he were somehow missing out. For instance, when Henry said he had not 
received oral sex, Chip sympathized, “Awe poor Henry.” 2 J.A. 359. “[P]romising [a] 
minor that sex would be pleasurable,” among other things, will support a conviction 
under § 2422(b). United States v. Dye, No. 09-3410, 2010 WL 4146187, at *3 (3d Cir. 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
When Henry inquired what he should expect from their planned encounter, Chip 
responded in graphic detail, intending to pique Henry’s interest: “I’d like to do you from 
the back while you’re leaning on the counter and sit you up on the counter when I make 
out with you while fucking you. Lastly, you can ride my cock until you cum over my 
chest.” 2 J.A. 342. And when Henry broached sexual subjects, Chip escalated them. For 
instance, when Henry asked Chip to define the terms “top” and “bottom,” Chip asked: 
“Do you watch gay porn?” 2 J.A. 256. Chip continued: “When you watch gay porn which 
turns you on the most. When the guy is fucking the other guy ass or when the other guy is 
being fucked?” 2 J.A. 257. These explicit messages can be construed as making the 
prospect of sex more alluring and enticing.  
Indeed, Chip’s graphic encouragement of Henry’s sexual interest mirrors the 
behavior of defendants in other cases in which courts have found enticement. See, e.g., 
Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 461–62 (affirming enticement conviction because defendant sent 
purported minor detailed and explicit descriptions of planned sexual acts and appeared at 
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the agreed-upon location to engage in them); see also United States v. Rounds, 749 F.3d 
326, 333 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Evidence can establish that a defendant intended to induce, 
persuade, entice, or coerce a minor by sending the minor sexually explicit messages.”); 
United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a defendant 
initiates conversation with a minor, describes the sexual acts that he would like to 
perform on the minor, and proposes a rendezvous to perform those acts, he has crossed 
the line toward persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in unlawful 
sexual activity.”).2 
Whatever the details of these messages, Chip’s larger point is that they show 
Henry’s interest in sex, making enticement effectively impossible. Summarizing a 
handful of decisions involving § 2422(b), Chip asserts that “[o]ther courts, while not 
stating the test in as many words, have upheld convictions only upon confirming the 
defendant sought to engage a minor in sexual activity the minor was not already pursuing 
independently.” Appellant’s Br. at 23–24. Chip over-reads these cases. While 
overcoming a minor’s unwillingness to engage in sexual activity can certainly support an 
                                              
2 See also United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding 
that “statements regarding the sex acts that [defendant] planned to perform on” minor 
were evidence of enticement, even if undercover agent posing as minor first mentioned 
the word “sex,” and the “sexually explicit conversations … provided overwhelming 
evidence to support the jury’s finding that [defendant] attempted to entice a minor”); 
United States v. Patten, 397 F.3d 1100, 1102–03 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that inquiring 
into minor’s sexual preferences and whether she would like to “hook up” constitutes 
sufficient evidence under § 2422(b)); United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant’s “statements and questions regarding virginity, sexual 
experiences, and his desire to perform oral sex” constitute sufficient evidence under 
§ 2422(b)). 
 
 
9 
 
enticement conviction, so can less stark instances of inducement. In fact, some language 
in those cases directly contradicts Chip’s argument. See, e.g., United States v. Kaye, 451 
F. Supp. 2d 775, 784 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“No degree of interest, curiosity, or mutual 
enticement from a thirteen-year-old is enough to find that Defendant’s aggressive 
language and actions are not an attempt to persuade, induce, and entice the individual to 
engage in sexual activity.”). A fairer reading of those cases—themselves just a smattering 
of decisions involving § 2422(b)—is that while it may be easier to show persuasion when 
a defendant badgers an unwilling minor into eventually acquiescing to sexual activity, 
enticing an already-curious minor to do so is also prohibited. It was not necessary to 
prove that Chip initially kindled a desire for sex in an otherwise-disinterested Henry; it 
was sufficient to prove that Chip knowingly persuaded (or attempted to persuade) Henry 
to engage in sexual activity. 
 In fact, several decisions have expressly or impliedly rejected Chip’s argument. 
See, e.g., Dye, 2010 WL 4146187, at *2–3 (determining that jurors had good reason to 
reject a “‘hot to trot’ defense” that argued that undercover agent’s “role playing made it 
clear from the outset that he was ready to go,” thus making enticement impossible); 
United States v. Lundy, 676 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument “that 
because [the fictitious minor] was willing, there was no enticement, inducement, or 
persuasion involved”); Dhingra, 371 F.3d at 567 (“The victim’s willingness to engage in 
sexual activity is irrelevant, in much the same way that a minor’s consent to sexual 
activity does not mitigate the offense of statutory rape or child molestation.”); United 
States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801, 809 (8th Cir. 2009) (“That [the minor] acted as though 
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they were ready and willing to engage in various sex acts does not vitiate [defendant’s] 
attempted enticement.”). 
Even were we to accept Chip’s standard—holding enticement impossible when a 
minor independently shows interest in sexual activity—Henry’s occasional hesitation 
means that Chip would fail his own test. Chip describes Henry’s interest in a sexual 
encounter as unwavering, but the record paints a more complicated picture.3 While Henry 
exhibited curiosity about sex, he also expressed concern about meeting a “creeper,” 
feared that anal sex could be painful, and threatened to break off communications at 
certain points. See, e.g., 2 J.A. 368–69 (stating, in response to Chip’s frustration over 
Henry’s refusal to provide his home address, “I don’t get u. Bye.”). This does not qualify 
as unwavering interest; rather, it shows that Chip had to continue pursuing Henry to 
induce him to go forward with the planned encounter. 
In sum, Chip’s conviction stands if a rational juror could have found him guilty 
under § 2422(b), and the messages at issue provide a basis for the jury’s guilty verdict. 
Chip’s argument to the contrary is undercut by both the record and other decisions 
upholding § 2422(b) convictions on similar facts. 
IV 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
3 See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 18 (“[A] person must do more than take advantage of 
an underage minor’s expressed and unwavering intention to engage in sexual activity.”); 
id. at 19 (“[I]t is not a violation of the statute to engage in sexual activity with a minor 
who wished from the outset to participate and never wavered in that intention.”); id. at 20 
(“At no point did Henry hesitate in that pursuit [of a sexual encounter].”). 
